

Chap II

developments caused OCI to expand the number of its analysts dealing with Vietnam and Communist China. Requests by such persons as Defense Secretary McNamara for detailed studies requiring months of work necessitated the presence in OCI of a sufficient number of persons to do the job. The frequent formation by Presidential directive of new organizations such as the Senior Interdepartmental Group called for the introduction of new publications. Many of the demands placed on OCI were beyond its control, and the reputation of the Agency as well as the Office rested on OCI's ability to handle them. Consequently, OCI's economies in 1966 were confined mainly to such things as cutting down overtime pay, thinning out the staff on duty on weekends, and ending subscriptions to various newspapers and periodicals. These were essentially minor annoyances. They disturbed OCI considerably less than the diminution in the flow of intelligence information which occurred in subsequent years as a result of <sup>201/ (economics introduced because of)</sup> the United States' deteriorating balance of payments position, ~~which made it more difficult for OCI to foresee and accurately analyze critical situations.~~

### Serving the President ~~and~~ and His Advisors

<sup>in</sup> ~~Virtually the only~~ point on which OCI was not on the defensive in 1966 was its relationship to the President and his topmost advisers. Here things went relatively smoothly. Since mid-1965, the President had ~~read~~ <sup>though OCI did not know how regularly</sup> the President's Daily Brief, and by 1966 Bromley Smith of the White House <sup>(occasional)</sup> staff was providing ~~regular~~ "feedback" on the President's reactions to it. No change in this publication was required for the time being. Furthermore, the President was beginning to rely on CIA (and OCI) for independent judgments on intelligence matters. For instance, on 1 February 1966 <sup>OCI published for</sup> the President ~~at his request~~ <sup>at his request</sup> an analysis of the effect of U.S. bombing on North Vietnam prior to 24 December 1965 and for North Vietnamese reaction to the bombing pause from 24 December to 31 January 1966. <sup>202/ (assess a suggestion)</sup> The President wished to use the information in answering critics of the resumption of bombing on 31 January. On 13 May, the President also asked the DCI to ~~investigate the truth of a statement~~ by Ambassador Lodge from Saigon to the effect that the favorable outcome of a recent Indonesian crisis involving conflict between the army and the Communist Party was in large part due to the determined U.S. stand in Vietnam. An OCI

203/ ~~204/~~  
 memorandum of 13 May stated there was no evidence to this effect. The relatively frequent interchanges between the Directorate of Intelligence and the White House staff also led to such requests as that by Walt Rostow on 4 August 1966 for CIA's opinion of a report published in DIA's special intelligence summary and its Daily Intelligence Summary <sup>5/10/66</sup> ~~to the effect~~ that the USSR was sending plutonium-239 to Communist China. <sup>204/</sup> ~~OCI and OSI collaborated on a reply.~~ Other White House requests continued to flow in to OCI on a regular basis.

OCI's relationship with Vice President Hubert Humphrey took an upturn in 1966 as well. Possibly stimulated by the facts that from May 1965 he had been placed on the distribution list of the President's Daily Brief, that during October 1965 he had for the first time in history been provided by radio and courier service with intelligence support during a tour of the United States, and that during his attendance at Indian Prime Minister Shastri's funeral in January 1966 OCI had voluntarily supplied extensive cable support, <sup>205/</sup> ~~(H. J. F. 6)~~ Vice President Humphrey on several occasions later in the year and throughout the rest of his term in office sought intelligence information from OCI. His letter of thanks which he wrote on 28 October 1965 after his return from the tour of the United States was effusive in tone.

25X1A Relations with Secretary of State Rusk, who accompanied the Vice President to Shastri's funeral, also improved from January 1966. The Secretary reportedly had asked his Bureau of Intelligence and Research to arrange for CIA intelligence support while he was on his trip. INR failed to comply -- which possibly explained <sup>why</sup> ~~OCI~~ had not received any <sup>earlier</sup> ~~previous~~ requests from Mr. Rusk for copies of the PDB while he was abroad. OCI's diligent effort to supply both the Vice President and the Secretary [REDACTED] with the PDB, the CIB, spot items, and selected materials on Vietnam elicited warm thanks from Mr. Rusk's Special Assistant, who stated the Secretary had never before received such assistance and cooperation when travelling. <sup>206/</sup> ~~From~~ that time <sup>forward</sup> ~~OCI~~ regularly provided <sup>Rusk</sup> ~~the Secretary of State~~ -- at his <sup>staff's</sup> ~~request~~ -- with daily intelligence coverage whenever he was abroad. For some time OCI made an effort to discuss with INR the materials to be sent the Secretary, but INR proved so intractable that OCI began to deal directly with

Vol. VI Chapter III President Johnson's Last Two Years

Serving the President - 1967-68

Serving the President and his top-level advisors continued to be one of OCI's major concerns in 1967 and 1968, both in regard to regular publications and to trip support.

As early as 26 August 1966, Bromley Smith of the White House staff had begun to suggest that the President's interest in the PDB would increase if there were some change in format and some "personalization" of the publication. On 6 September he again hinted that articles on subjects in which the President was personally interested would be welcome. On 25 January 1967, Mr. Smith remarked that articles on Africa were hard to sell, but that consumer interest in Latin America, the Far East, and the larger European countries was high. He noted that the President was particularly interested in items concerning individuals with whom he was acquainted. By 28 February, the White House had informed DIA (which informed OCI) that it had a special interest in Southeast Asia and that the Pentagon, as well as other agencies, should make a maximum effort to interpret and analyze the situation there rather than to report it statistically and summarily. By the same date, OCI had been told that the President now wished to receive the PDB at 0630 hours instead of in the evening and that he intended to read it just before he turned to his newspapers.

This placed a difficult and special burden on OCI. Not only did it have to compete with a "souped up" DIA Intelligence Summary but it also had to be mindful of - and responsive to - what the morning papers (delivered in OCI about 0200) and their columnists would say. On the subject of Vietnam, the PDB now had to compete specifically with the information received by the President during his regular morning call to the Pentagon's overnight duty office. Operationally, the new schedule meant that OCI had to have a PDB staffer come aboard at 0100 and prepare a draft to go to press at 0500 for delivery to the White House at 0600. Special printing and courier services also had to be laid on. Furthermore, D/OCI's critical review of the draft PDB had to be completed before 0500 and D/OCI was still expected to be at the Director's morning meeting at 0900. The single concession made to OCI was

that Sunday delivery of the PDB was discontinued. OCI rose to the task, and

no need to consider how to improve the PDB and other publications to suit President Johnson. Having made his choice, the President was considerably less active in visiting foreign countries than he had been in 1967. OCI was called to form only a single Presidential Trip Task Force during 1968, in connection with the President's visit to the city of San Salvador in El Salvador for a meeting of the Organization of Central American States on matters involving political democracy, economic development, and social justice. The President subsequently visited Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala on the way home. The supporting task force was headed by [REDACTED] Created by [REDACTED] OCI Notice 50-89 of 3 July 1968, it went into operation from 5 to 8 July and issued both the usual daily and spot memoranda on the security situation (called Central American Security Situation Reports) and a series of Central America Roundups containing reporting and commentary connected with the meeting about as well as news of developments elsewhere in the hemisphere/which OCI felt the President should be informed. There was no special feature displayed by this task force.

25X1A

President Johnson's thinking <sup>about</sup> ~~in the direction of~~ phasing out of office was clearly illustrated by his order in July 1968 that CIA and other government agencies begin to collect copies of all significant documents prepared for the White House during his tenure in office. <sup>These were to be shipped</sup> ~~For shipment~~ to the Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, whose completion was anticipated by 1970. This created <sup>(wished to protect the security of all records sent to the library.)</sup> something of a stir in CIA, since the Agency ~~had never been satisfied as to what happened after President Kennedy's assassination to the documents produced by CIA -- including some extremely sensitive ones -- which had been in the White House files.~~ There was a strong feeling that COMINT materials and other exotic information should not be despatched to Austin. On the other hand, it was recognized that offices like OCI produced so much highly classified paper that only a small fragment of their output could be sent to Austin if the highly classified material were excluded. After much discussion, an appeal was finally made to the United States Intelligence Board which authorized the shipment to Austin of all information except that derived from satellite photography and other special means.

While the discussion was underway, personnel were appointed in each

Directorate of the Agency to oversee the collection of copies of all intelligence output, pending a decision as to which ones would be released to the Johnson

25X1A Library. By 24 July, [REDACTED] who was in charge of the project for

25X1A the DDI complex, submitted to [REDACTED], the overall supervisor, a list of names of one person in each DDI office who would act as a contact point for that office. <sup>236</sup> ~~(236)~~ [REDACTED], who had just returned from

a ~~xxxxxx~~ sabbatical year of study at Ohio State University, was asked to prepare a list of all OCI's intelligence production for the White House between November 1963 and mid-1968. By early January 1969, when he was given a rotational ~~post~~ <sup>ASST. Training</sup> in the Office of Training, [REDACTED] had assembled a list of 3,485 memoranda and special publications, <sup>and</sup> ~~1,608~~ Central Intelligence Bulletins and 164 Current Intelligence Weekly Reviews (which were on film).

25X1A He had also compiled a history of the 25 task forces OCI had activated during the period. <sup>237</sup> ~~(237)~~ The herculean task of locating spare copies of publications and of reproducing copies of unique documents, as well as of organizing this large quantity of paper into a form suitable for shipment to Austin fell to OCI's Information Control Officer, [REDACTED] spent many days combing various components of OCI and searching through the holdings of the CIA Records Center for elusive materials. When his job was completed, he had 15 cartons of documents ready for shipment. <sup>238</sup> ~~(238)~~ [REDACTED]

Although unique in OCI's experience, the Johnson Library project had engaged two persons for several months and had sent many analysts briefly to their files in search of spare copies of publications. It was an exercise which did not directly benefit OCI, ~~and which did not directly profit either the Agency or the U.S. Government.~~ Nevertheless, President Franklin Roosevelt had started a trend by establishing a home for his state papers in Hyde Park, New York; the Kennedy papers had been <sup>collected</sup> ~~spirited out of the White House~~, presumably with a similar aim; and Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson had built special libraries in which to store their White House documents. There seemed a strong probability that future Presidents would wish to do likewise. OCI therefore gave some thought as to whether documents could be systematically collected and stored against the time of another request. As of mid-1970,

however, no specific procedure had materialized.

The prospective transfer of Presidential authority as a result of national elections in November 1968 also involved OCI in the quadrennial activity of briefing potential future Presidents. OCI's role in 1968, however, was considerably more limited than it had been in the past. <sup>From</sup> Since 1952, the White House had assigned the briefing role to CIA alone, and in 1952, 1956, and 1960, ~~and in 1964~~, OCI had had a major role in preparing material <sup>and presenting</sup> for the briefings, ~~and in actually presenting them~~. In 1968, on the other hand, the White House <sup>exercised</sup> ~~maintained~~ stronger control over the briefings. DCI Helms ~~did~~ himself brief Vice President Humphrey, Richard Nixon, and George Wallace after the nominating conventions. On other occasions, however, the White House called on other agencies as well as CIA to contribute to them. Once, for instance, briefings were given by representatives from the State and Defense Departments as well as by DDCI Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, and OCI's only part in them was in preparing material for Admiral Taylor to use. <sup>2391/2 21</sup>

With Richard M. Nixon's election victory on 7 November 1968, OCI became deeply involved in an Agency effort to provide intelligence support to the President-elect. President Johnson had proposed to make available to Mr. Nixon the same intelligence publications that were shown daily to him, and he instructed DCI Helms to arrange for daily briefings of the President-elect and his staff. Accordingly, OCI, as executive agent for the Directorate of Intelligence and the DCI, was assigned the task of making arrangements and conducting the briefings.

This staff operated from 19 November 1968 to 17 January 1969, ~~at a cost to the Agency of about \$28,000, not counting~~

The full story of the operation is contained in Directorate of Intelligence History OCI-2, entitled Intelligence Support for President-elect Richard M. Nixon, 19 November 1968 - 17 January 1969

(TOP SECRET UMBRA SENSITIVE NO FOREIGN DISSEM), written by ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~. Suffice it to say here that all of OCI's intelligence publications, including the President's Daily Brief, were made available to Mr. Nixon, while most

publications except the PDB were open to his staff's perusal. In addition,

OCI supplied special intelligence memoranda on subjects of interest to the incoming President but not to the intelligence community in general. With the appointment on 2 December 1968 of Henry J. Kissinger as the President-elect's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the CIA team received instructions from Kissinger that all information should be funneled through him to the President and that henceforth intelligence support should be provided only to Mr. Nixon and himself. [This effectively cut CIA off from any direct contact with Mr. Nixon.] When [redacted] subsequently discovered that Mr. Nixon had not read any of the intelligence documents previously delivered in sealed envelopes to his secretary each morning, it became obvious that at no time during the entire operation had the President-elect received information directly from CIA. The press of business prevented Mr. Kissinger either from reading all the publications or from perusing many of the briefing materials prepared at his own request by [redacted] and CIA components in Washington. He did, however, ask innumerable questions and demand considerable speculative comment on the significance of various developments. He also gradually became familiar with CIA's capabilities and its position in the intelligence community. Furthermore, he began to press for a new style of intelligence reporting which would summarize a piece of news, indicate the problem posed by it, and analyze its meaning and significance. OCI therefore began to tailor [redacted] the PDB to Kissinger's specifications. After President Nixon's inauguration on 20 January 1969, Kissinger demanded the same form of reporting, and OCI gradually inserted into its publications a style more similar to a legal brief than before.

From 14 December 1968, Mr. Kissinger directed that Attorney General-designate John N. Mitchell, who had been named to that post two days earlier, be given free access to all publications and information in which he expressed an interest. This constituted an important break-through for CIA, since Mr. Mitchell -- who was to become one of Mr. Nixon's closest advisors in Washington-- displayed a keen interest in what he read and heard. Shortly after 14 December, [redacted] began to meet almost daily with Mr. Mitchell, and after the latter arrived in Washington he arranged for a daily intelligence briefing to be given to him in his office by an OCI officer. [redacted] now in OCI, continued to handle this

25X1A

task till 26 October 1969, when he was replaced by [REDACTED] Though OCI's service for Mr. Mitchell was almost entirely confined to briefings, and the Office only occasionally prepared short memoranda for him, OCI at least *enjoyed the responsibility of supporting the President's closest* ~~retained the interest of a Cabinet-level officer in the Nixon administration~~ *adviser.* ~~to replace the loss of its relationship with Defense Secretary McNamara.~~

#### Emergency Task Forces, 1967-68

Emergency task forces consumed considerably more of OCI's time in 1967 than did Presidential trip task forces, and they disrupted the other activities of the office.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

The first task force of the year was ordered up by D/OCI Godfrey to cover the military coup against King Constantine of Greece in April. This force was headed by [REDACTED] Chief, Greece-Turkey-Iran Branch, and, with one exception, it included only members of [REDACTED] branch. No other Office was formally represented on the task force, though close contact was maintained with DD/P. Between 21 and 23 April, the members of the group published three situation reports a day -- at 0600, 1200, and in the late afternoon, <sup>but</sup> the crisis soon abated and only two special memoranda were required. <sup>240/</sup> [REDACTED]

25X1D

25X1D

25X1A

25X1C

25X1C

25X1A

The most time-consuming task force of the year was the Arab-Israeli Task Force, which operated from 23 May to 4 July to cover the buildup and the aftermath as well as the war itself between Israel and the Arab states from 5 to 10 June. Because of the very wide ramifications of the war, which included the danger of Soviet intervention, ~~and~~ the extensive disruption of world shipping and oil supplies, the use of the Washington-Moscow "hot line", frequent calls to CINC USNAVEUR in London, [REDACTED] direct telephone conversations with the [REDACTED] and contacts with [REDACTED] on such matters as the freedom of the seas, the demands on OCI were very heavy. Since high-level interest in Washington was intense, all features of task force operations were employed by CIA.

The task force was informally created by the DD/I on 23 May, simultaneously *The calling of* with a special Watch Committee meeting. <sup>DD/I</sup> Notice ~~50-55~~ <sup>50-55</sup> of 24 May 1967

formally named [REDACTED] Chief, Middle East Division, OCI, as head